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Abstract
Wecharacterize a sellingmechanism that is robust to the seller’s uncertainty about
the buyer’s signal structure. We show that by offering a generous refund policy the
seller can significantly reduce this type of uncertainty and regain market power. A
simplemechanism that utilizes a generous refundpolicy and randomdiscounts achieves
the best guaranteed-profit among all possible mechanisms.
JEL: D82, C79, D42
Keywords: optimal pricing, robustness, return policies, refunds, monopoly, informa-
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1 Introduction
We analyze a seller’s robust pricing problem in the face of uncertainty about the buyer’s
information and learning. Consumers learn about product characteristics from various
sources, and firms are often not only uncertain about howmuch value buyers receive from
consuming their products but also how well buyers know whether these products fit their
needs. For example, an online shoe store does not know whether the shopper has been
“showrooming” and already knows whether particular shoes fit well. Similarly, a booking
agent does not know whether a consumer planning to book a flight has a specific travel
itinerary in mind or not. Such uncertainty regarding the buyer’s information and learning
can severely limit the seller’s ability to extract profits from trade.
What profit can the seller guarantee itself in the presence of such uncertainty? How
should the seller set the price to achieve the best guaranteed-profit? We show that a simple
mechanism that combines a generous refund policy with random non-refundable offers is
the answer.
*We are grateful to Pak Hung Au, Laura Doval, Juan Dubra, Jeff Ely, Dino Gerardi, Marit Hinnosaar,
Johannes Hörner, Teddy Kim, Anton Kolotilin, Hongyi Li, Giorgio Martini, Ignacio Monzón, Alessandro
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More specifically, we analyze a bilateral trade model, where the buyer’s valuation of
the product is either high or low, and the exact value is unknown to everyone including
the buyer. The seller and the buyer share a common prior about the buyer’s valuation.
The buyer observes a private signal of her valuation but learns her valuation only after
purchasing the product. The seller can allow the buyer to return the product but incurs a
restocking cost for each returned product.
The key feature of the model is the seller’s uncertainty about the buyer’s information
structure (i.e., the distribution of signals). The seller neither knows the buyer’s signal dis-
tribution nor has a prior belief about possible signal distributions. He only knows that the
signals satisfy Bayes’ rule.1 For example, the support of the signal distribution may only
consist of moderate signals, i.e., the buyer’s information structure may be quite uninfor-
mative. Then a sufficiently high price would result in no sales. Alternatively, the buyer’s
signal distribution may generate either a sufficiently favorable or unfavorable signal, i.e.,
the buyer’s information structuremay be quite informative. Then, setting a lowpricewould
leave a lot of money on the table.
Our goal is to identify the seller’s selling mechanism that performs as well as possi-
ble regardless of the buyer’s signal distribution. We show that a simple mechanism that
randomizes between an offer with a generous refund and log-uniformly distributed non-
refundable discounted offers achieves the seller’s best guaranteed-profit, i.e., the profit the
seller can guarantee irrespective of the buyer’s signal distribution.
To understand the intuition behind our result, we first note that by offering a generous
refund the seller can reduce the importance of the buyer’s signal in the purchasing decision.
That is, for any given buyer’s signal distribution, the buyer is more likely to buy the product
at the same price with a refund thanwithout. Bymaking the buyer’s demand less elastic this
way, a generous refund enables the seller to charge a higher price without sacrificing the
probability of trade. The seller, however, needs to be wary of costs associated with product
return. For each returned product, the seller incurs the restocking cost. Thus, the seller
must ensure that if an offer is refundable, it is only attractive to the buyer who is unlikely to
return the product (i.e., the one with a sufficiently favorable signal). By doing so, the seller
can ensure that the buyer who accepts the refundable offer always brings a positive profit
in expectation. The seller achieves this goal by offering a generous but not full refund.
We also note that, loosely speaking, any pricing policy that brings a large profit when
the buyer is relatively well-informed tends to perform poorly when the buyer is relatively
uninformed, and vice versa. Therefore, to increase its guaranteed profit, the seller needs to
hedge simultaneously against the buyer’s signal distributions that are relatively informative
and relatively uninformative.
With these observations at hand, we now explain why the seller can achieve the best
guaranteed-profit through the mixture of a generous refund (that is only attractive to the
buyer with a sufficiently favorable signal) and random non-refundable offers (that are at-
tractive to the buyer only when her signal is moderate or favorable). The generous re-
fund brings a large profit if and only if the buyer’s signal distribution is likely to gener-
ate sufficiently favorable signals. A non-refundable offer brings a large profit if and only
if the buyer’s signal distribution is likely to generate a signal that is equal to or slightly
1Theenvironmentwhere the seller chooses a price-refund pair without knowing the realized signal drawn
from a commonly-known distribution is analyzed in Inderst and Tirosh (2015) and Krahmer and Strausz
(2015).
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above the price offered by the seller. Furthermore, for any buyer’s signal distribution un-
der which the refundable offer brings a small profit, the randomized non-refundable offer
brings a sufficiently large profit and vice versa.2 In this sense, the refundable offer hedges
against the event that the signal distribution is informative, and the randomization over
non-refundable offers hedges against the less informative distributions. This observation
also explains why the seller who is interested in maximizing the guaranteed-profit would
find it optimal to always use a generous refundable offer with a positive probability no
matter how high the restocking cost to the seller is.
We then use our findings to derive the buyer-optimal information structure, as well
as the sharp upper-bound of the buyer’s payoff with respect to the possible information
structure. More specifically, we analyze the buyer-optimal information design problem,
where the buyer first chooses an information structure, and the seller chooses an optimal
pricing and refund policy knowing the buyer’s information structure.3 We show that the
buyer-optimal signal distribution is the worst-possible distribution to the seller (i.e., the
distribution forwhich the seller’smaximal profit is exactly the best guaranteed-profit). This
finding implies that if we compare the highest payoffs the buyer can obtain (by choosing
her information structure) when the seller can offer a refund and cannot offer a refund,
then the former is strictly lower than the latter. In this sense, a refund policy increases the
seller’s market power against buyers who search information strategically.
Our findings are closely related to the results in Roesler and Szentes (2017) and Du
(2018). Roesler and Szentes (2017) identify the information structure that maximizes the
buyer’s welfare when the seller best responds to the information structure via uniform
pricing. Du (2018) shows that the information structure found in Roesler and Szentes
(2017) indeed minimizes the profit the seller can obtain, and the seller can obtain the best
guaranteed-profit by what he calls an exponential pricing regardless of the buyer’s signal
distribution.4
Unlike the present paper, these papers do not consider the possibility of product re-
turns. With a refund policy, the seller can potentially increase his profit through two chan-
nels. The seller can indirectly control the buyer’s learning by incentivizing the buyer to
learn through purchase. The seller also can sequentially screen the buyer, first by the signal
distribution and the signal; and then by the realized valuation for the product.5 Therefore,
the selling mechanism that maximizes the seller’s best guaranteed-profit may be complex.
Nevertheless, we obtain results parallel to Roesler and Szentes (2017) andDu (2018): a gen-
eralization of the signal distribution identified in Roesler and Szentes (2017) is the worst
2The Bayes-plausibility requires that the expected value of the posteriors induced by the buyer’s signal
distribution must be equal to the prior. Loosely speaking, this implies that when the buyer’s signal distribu-
tion is likely to generate a sufficiently favorable signal, it also is likely to generate a sufficiently unfavorable
signal.
3For example, the buyer may delegate the information gathering to a third party such as an algorithm or
an employee to commit to a certain information structure.
4Libgober and Mu (2017) analyze a robust dynamic pricing problem where the product is durable and
buyers learn about their value for the product over time.
5The literature on sequential screening and dynamic mechanism design has identified why and how ad-
vance sales to still-uninformed consumers can help the seller. See e.g., Gale andHolmes (1992, 1993); Courty
and Li (2000); Eső and Szentes (2007); Nocke et al. (2011); Gallego and Sahin (2010); Ely et al. (2017). The
closest to our paper is von Wangenheim (2017), who studies a model where the buyer learns the value over
time and the seller can offer flexible contracts, which can be interpreted as a (costless) refund policy. He finds
that the seller obtains the static monopoly profit, which means capturing full surplus in our framework.
3
possible buyer’s signal distribution for the seller; and an extension of the exponential pric-
ing found in Du (2018) achieves the seller’s best guaranteed-profit against any possible
buyer’s signal distributions.
Our findings offer a novel rationale for generous return policies. The literature has
identified various reasons that companies may use return policies: e.g., as costly signals
for product quality and product fit for the consumer (Grossman (1981); Moorthy and
Srinivasan (1995); Inderst and Ottaviani (2013)); as insurance for risk-averse consumers
(Che (1996)); and as a tool for price discrimination (Zhang (2013); Escobari and Jindapon
(2014); Inderst and Tirosh (2015)).6 Among these, the closest to our paper is Inderst and
Tirosh (2015). In an environment where the seller knows the buyer’s signal distribution,
Inderst and Tirosh (2015) show that return policies work as “metering devices”, where re-
funds make different consumers more similar and thus allow the firm to capture more of
the surplus by raising prices.7 Consequently, the seller sets the refund amount above the
restocking cost. In contrast, our results show that the seller offers a generous refund (i.e.,
“almost” full refund) when the seller is uncertain of the buyer’s signal distribution.
Lastly, we note that the model analyzed in the present paper can be interpreted as a
game between the seller, who aims to maximize his profit by choosing a price-refund pair,
and the adversarial nature, who aims to minimize the seller’s profit by choosing the buyer’s
signal distribution. Thus, the game is akin to Bayesian persuasion games with competing
senders. We therefore fully utilize the concavification technique (Aumann et al. (1995);
Kamenica andGentzkow (2011)); and the properties of equilibriumpayoff functions in the
competitive Bayesian-persuasion settings (Boleslavsky and Cotton (2018); Au and Kawai
(2017a,b)) to derive our results.
2 Model
There is a (male) seller who can produce a product at no cost, and a (female) buyer whose
valuation for the product is 𝑣 ∈ {0, 1}. The buyer’s valuation 𝑣 follows a commonly known
distribution such that𝜋 = Pr (𝑣 = 1). Neither the seller nor the buyer knows the realization
of 𝑣. However, the buyer receives a signal of her valuation 𝑣 prior to purchase. (Details will
be explained below.)
We start our analysis with the case in which the seller’s (pure) strategy is a contract
(𝑝, 𝑟) that specifies a price 𝑝 together with a refund 𝑟. The seller may use a mixed strategy
𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)}. We call the seller’s mixed strategy, i.e., a distribution over contracts, a policy;
and the realized contract an offer. Based on the information she has, the buyer decides
whether to buy after observing the contract (𝑝, 𝑟). We analyze the more general setting in
which the seller can offer any mechanism in Section 3.4.
If the buyer purchases the product, then she learns the realized value of 𝑣. If the realized
offer is non-refundable (i.e. 𝑟 = 0), then the game ends. If 𝑟 > 0, then the buyer decides
whether or not to return the product. When the product is returned, the seller incurs a
6Escobari and Jindapon (2014) also provide some empirical evidence on the use of refundable tickets by
airlines. They show that a fully refundable ticket is typically about 50%more expensive than a non-refundable
ticket, but the difference disappears in the last week before the departure. These facts fit well with our model
predictions.
7Similar ideas have been studied in other contexts, such as overbooking by airlines, e.g., Ely et al. (2017).
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commonly known restocking cost 𝑐 > 0. We sometimes use 𝛾 ≡ 𝑐1+𝑐 ∈ (0, 1) to denote the
normalized restocking cost.
If the buyer purchases and keeps the product then her payoff is 𝑣 − 𝑝, and the seller’s
profit is 𝑝. If the realized offer is refundable (i.e., 𝑟 > 0) and she returns the product, then
her payoff is 𝑟 − 𝑝, and the seller’s profit is 𝑝 − 𝑟 − 𝑐 = 𝑝 − 𝑟 − 𝛾1−𝛾 . If the buyer does not
buy the product, then her payoff and the seller’s profit are both zero.
We can represent a buyer’s signal as a posterior 𝑞 = Pr (𝑣 = 1) that is a random variable
drawn from a distribution function 𝐹 ∈ F ≡ {𝐹 ∶ 𝔼𝐹 [𝑞] = 𝜋}.8 For this reason, we use a
distribution 𝐹 over posteriors to represent the buyer’s information structure, and call it a
signal distribution. Analogously, by a signal 𝑞, we refer to the realization of the posterior
from signal distribution 𝐹.
Take an arbitrary buyer’s signal distribution 𝐹. We use 𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) to represent the
seller’s expected profit when the offer is (𝑝, 𝑟), and 𝔼𝛥{(𝑝,𝑟)}𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) to represent the
expected profit from policy 𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)}. We say policy 𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)} guarantees profit 𝑉 when
𝔼𝛥{(𝑝,𝑟)}𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) ≥ 𝑉 for all 𝐹 ∈ F,
i.e., min𝐹∈F 𝔼𝛥{(𝑝,𝑟)}𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) ≥ 𝑉. Our goal is to identify a strategy 𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)} that
brings the best guaranteed-profit defined by
𝑉∗ ≡ sup
𝛥{(𝑝,𝑟)}
min
𝐹∈F
𝔼𝛥{(𝑝,𝑟)}𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) .
The best guaranteed-profit is the supremumof the profits the seller can guarantee in the
following game against a fictitious player called the (adversarial) nature whose objective is
to minimize the seller’s expected profit:
1. The seller chooses a policy 𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)}.
2. Nature chooses a signal distribution𝐹 after observing the seller’s choice of𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)}.
3. The buyer observes a signal 𝑞 ∼ 𝐹 and an offer (𝑝, 𝑟) ∼ 𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)}.
4. The buyer decides whether or not to buy. If she does not buy, the game ends.
5. The buyer learns the value 𝑣 if she buys. If 𝑟 = 0, the game ends.
6. If 𝑟 > 0, the buyer decides whether or not to return the product.
7. If the buyer returns the product, the seller refunds 𝑟 to the buyer, and incurs the
restocking cost 𝑐.
3 Best Guaranteed-Profit
We characterize the best guaranteed-profit 𝑉∗ by identifying its lower and upper bounds.
We first identify the seller’s best guaranteed-profit from a deterministic policy (Lemma 1).
That is, we identify
𝑉∗ ≡ sup
(𝑝,𝑟)
min
𝐹∈F
𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟)|𝐹) .
8Notice that 𝐹 ∈ F if and only if ∫10 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 = 1 − 𝜋.
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Next we derive a worst distribution 𝐹𝑉∗ for the seller by analyzing an auxiliary game in
which the seller chooses his pricing policy after nature chooses the buyer’s signal distribu-
tion (Lemma 3). That is, we derive
𝐹𝑉∗ ∈ argmin𝐹∈F sup(𝑝,𝑟)
𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) and 𝑉∗ ≡ sup
(𝑝,𝑟)
𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) .
While𝑉∗ ≤ 𝑉∗ ≤ 𝑉∗ by construction, there exists a threshold value 𝛾 such that if the (nor-
malized) restocking cost 𝛾 ∈ (0, 𝛾] then 𝑉∗ = 𝑉∗ and therefore the best guaranteed-profit
𝑉∗ = 𝑉∗ = 𝑉∗ can be achieved by a deterministic policy. In contrast, if the normalized
restocking cost is higher, i.e. 𝛾 ∈ (𝛾, 1), then 𝑉∗ < 𝑉∗ and therefore there is room for
improvement from a randomized policy. In this case we show that a randomization over a
refundable offer with a generous refund and log-uniformly distributed non-refundable of-
fers achieves the upper bound 𝑉∗ regardless of the signal structure 𝐹 (Theorem 1). Lastly,
we show that there exists no mechanism that guarantees the seller a higher profit than
𝑉∗ = 𝑉∗ (Theorem 2).
3.1 Best Guaranteed-Profit with Deterministic Policies
We start our analysis by identifying the best guaranteed-profit by a deterministic policy.
That is, we characterize 𝑉∗ ≡ sup(𝑝,𝑟)min𝐹∈F 𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟)|𝐹), which is a lower bound for 𝑉
∗.
Let 𝑣 (𝑞| (𝑝, 𝑟)) denote the seller’s expected profit when the offer is (𝑝, 𝑟) and the buyer’s
signal is 𝑞. Then, 𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) = 𝔼𝐹 [𝑣 (𝑞| (𝑝, 𝑟))]. Also for notational simplicity, we use
𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟) to denote its minimum over 𝐹, i.e, 𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟) ≡ min𝐹∈F 𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹), so the best
guaranteed-profit with deterministic offers is 𝑉∗ = sup(𝑝,𝑟)𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟).
Suppose that the sellermakes a non-refundable offer (𝑝, 0). Then, the buyer with signal
𝑞 buys if and only if 𝑞 ≥ 𝑝, i.e.,
𝑣 (𝑞| (𝑝, 0)) = { 0 if 𝑞 ≤ 𝑝,𝑝 if 𝑞 > 𝑝.
The seller’s profit𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) is minimizedwhen the probability of the buyer’s signal being
larger than𝑝 is minimized, i.e., when𝐹minimizes 1−𝐹 (𝑝) subject to𝔼𝐹 [𝑞] = 𝜋. If𝜋 > 𝑝,
then this occurs when the buyer’s signal distribution induces two signals 𝑝 (which results
in no trade) and 1 (which results in trade) with probabilities 1−𝜋1−𝑝 , and
𝜋−𝑝
1−𝑝 , respectively. In
contrast, if 𝜋 ≤ 𝑝, then this occurs when the buyer’s signal does not disclose any additional
information, i.e., induces signal 𝜋 (which results in no trade) with probability one.
More formally, we can derive 𝑉 (𝑝, 0) by utilizing the concavification approach.9 Let
con [−𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 0))] (𝑞) be the value of concave closure of −𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 0)) at 𝑞, which is rep-
resented by the red-dotted line in Figure 1.10 Then 𝑉 (𝑝, 0) = −con [−𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 0))] (𝜋).
While a higher 𝑝 results in a higher profit margin should trade occur, it leads to a lower
9See Aumann et al. (1995) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
10The concave closure of function 𝐺 is defined by con [𝐺] (𝑞) = sup{𝑔|(𝑞, 𝑔) ∈ co(𝐺)}, where co(𝐺) is the
convex hull of the graph of 𝐺.
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probability of trade. The seller balances this trade-off by offering 𝑝 = 1 − √1 − 𝜋, so
𝑉 (𝑝, 0) = −con [−𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 0))] (𝜋) = {
0 if 𝑝 ≥ 𝜋
𝑝 × 𝜋−𝑝1−𝑝 if 𝑝 < 𝜋
≤ sup
𝑝
𝑉 (𝑝, 0) = sup
𝑝∈[0,𝜋]
𝑝𝜋 − 𝑝1 − 𝑝 = (1 −
√1 − 𝜋)2 .(1)
𝑞0
0
𝑝
𝑝
1
1
𝑉 (𝑝, 0)
𝜋
𝑣(𝑞|(𝑝, 0))
−con [−𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 0))] (𝑞)
Figure 1: Profit of a non-refundable offer (𝑝, 0)
Next, consider a refundable offer, i.e., (𝑝, 𝑟) such that 𝑟 > 0. Without loss of generality,
we only consider the case where 𝑝 ≥ 𝑟.11 Thepayoff of the buyer with signal 𝑞 from buying
is 𝑞 × 1 + (1 − 𝑞) × 𝑟 − 𝑝. She thus buys only if her signal is above the marginal signal
𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) ≡ 𝑝−𝑟1−𝑟 ; and returns with probability 1 − 𝑞 if she buys. The seller’s profit from the
buyer with signal 𝑞 is thus
(2) 𝑣 (𝑞| (𝑝, 𝑟)) =
{
{
{
0 if 𝑞 < 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) ,
min {0, 𝑣 (𝑞; 𝑝, 𝑟)} if 𝑞 = 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) ,
𝑣 (𝑞; 𝑝, 𝑟) if 𝑞 > 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) ,
where 𝑣 (𝑞; 𝑝, 𝑟) ≡ 𝑝 − (1 − 𝑞) (𝑐 + 𝑟) = 𝑝 − (1 − 𝑞) ( 𝛾1−𝛾 + 𝑟).
Observe that if the marginal signal 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) is low, i.e., if the refund is generous, then
the buyer buys even when her signal 𝑞 is low. The buyer with a low signal is likely to return
the product, and thereby is likely to bring the seller an (ex-post) negative profit. More
specifically, as captured by the increasing blue-lines in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), the seller’s
profit from the buyer with signal 𝑞 conditional on sales 𝑣 (𝑞; 𝑝, 𝑟) is increasing in 𝑞; and the
profit from the buyer with signal 𝛾 is negative, i.e., 𝑣 (𝛾; 𝑝, 𝑟) < 0 if and only if 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) < 𝛾.
Therefore, if 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) < 𝛾, then the seller’s profit is minimized when the probability
of the seller receiving a signal 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) is maximized, as captured by the red dotted-line in
Figure 2(a). The seller then can improve his guaranteed-profit by offering a less generous
refund, and thereby increasing the marginal signal.
In contrast, if the marginal signal is sufficiently high, i.e., 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) > 𝛾, then the buyer
who buys the product always brings a positive (ex-post) profit to the seller. The seller’s
11Notice that if 𝑝 < 𝑟, then the buyer buys irrespective of the value of the signal. Therefore, 𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟) <
𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟 − 𝜀) for a sufficiently small 𝜀 > 0.
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𝑞0
0
𝑝
𝑝𝛾𝑞
𝑣(𝑞)
1
𝑣(𝑞|(𝑝, 𝑟))
−con [−𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 𝑟))] (𝑞)
(a) 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) < 𝛾
𝑞0
0
𝑝
𝑝𝛾 𝑞
𝑣(𝑞)
1
𝑣(𝑞|(𝑝, 𝑟))
−con [−𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 𝑟))] (𝑞)
(b) 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) > 𝛾
Figure 2: Profit from a refundable offer (𝑝, 𝑟)
profit is thus minimized when the probability of the seller receiving a signal above 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟)
is minimized, as captured by the red dotted line in Figure 2(b). The seller then can improve
his guaranteed-profit by offering a more generous refund, and thereby by lowering the
marginal signal.
Combining these observations, we conclude that if the seller were to offer a positive
refund, then he would set the price 𝑝 as close to one as possible, and 𝑟 to 𝑝−𝛾1−𝛾 so that the
marginal signal is exactly at 𝑞(𝑝, 𝑟) = 𝛾. By doing so, the seller can guarantee himself 𝜋−𝛾1−𝛾 .
Therefore, when 𝑟 > 0,
𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟) = −con [−𝑣 (⋅| (𝑝, 𝑟))] (𝜋) ≤ sup
𝑝,𝑟>0
𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟) = max{𝜋 − 𝛾1 − 𝛾 , 0} .
Recall that the seller’s best guaranteed-profit without any refund is (1 − √1 − 𝜋)2, as de-
rived in (1). Thus, the seller’s best guaranteed-profit with a deterministic policy is
(3) 𝑉∗ = sup
𝑝,𝑟
𝑉 (𝑝, 𝑟) =
{
{
{
𝜋−𝛾
1−𝛾 if 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾 (𝜋) ,
(1 − √1 − 𝜋)2 if 𝛾 > 𝛾 (𝜋) ,
where 𝛾 (𝜋) ≡ 2(1−
√1−𝜋)
2−√1−𝜋 . The resulting best guaranteed-profit 𝑉
∗ is depicted in Figure 3.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the seller can only use a deterministic pricing policy (𝑝, 𝑟). Then the
seller’s best guaranteed-profit is 𝑉∗ defined in (3). For any 𝜀 > 0, either a generous refund
(𝑝, 𝑟) = (1 − 𝜀, 1 − 𝜀1−𝛾) (when 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾 (𝜋)), or no refund (𝑝, 𝑟) = (1 − √1 − 𝜋, 0) (when
𝛾 ≥ 𝛾 (𝜋)) guarantees profit of (1 − 𝜀) 𝑉∗.
3.2 Best Guaranteed-Profit with Policy-Independent Signals
We now consider an auxiliary game in which the seller chooses his pricing policy 𝛥{(𝑝, 𝑟)}
after observing the nature’s choice of the buyer’s signal distribution 𝐹. By analyzing this
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𝛾0 𝛾 𝜋
No refundGenerous refund
1
1
𝜋
Generous refund: 𝜋−𝛾1−𝛾
No refund: (1 − √1 − 𝜋)2
Figure 3: Best guaranteed-profit 𝑉∗ with a deterministic offer
game, we identify a worst distribution for the seller 𝐹𝑉∗ , i.e.,
𝐹𝑉∗ ∈ argmin𝐹∈F sup(𝑝,𝑟)
𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) .
Then 𝑉∗ ≡ sup(𝑝,𝑟) 𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) defines an upper bound of 𝑉
∗.
As we discussed in Section 3.1, for a given offer (𝑝, 𝑟), the marginal signal is 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) =
𝑝−𝑟
1−𝑟 . Therefore, when the buyer’s signal distribution is 𝐹, the seller’s profit from an offer
(𝑝, 𝑟) is
𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) = 𝑝 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟))) − 1𝑟>0 (𝑐 + 𝑟) ∫
1
𝑞(𝑝,𝑟)
(1 − 𝑞)𝑑𝐹 (𝑞) .
To facilitate the further discussion, for any small 𝜀, we say (𝑝, 𝑟) = (1 − 𝜀, 1 − 𝜀1−𝛾) is
an offer with a generous refund. Notice that themarginal signal for an offer with a generous
refund is 𝛾, and hence the seller’s profit from a generous refund is (1 − 𝜀) ∫1𝛾
𝑞−𝛾
1−𝛾𝑑𝐹 (𝑞) ≥ 0.
Also, when the buyer’s signal distribution is 𝐹, by the profit from a generous refund, which
we denote by𝑉𝑅 (𝐹), we refer to the supremum of the profits the seller can achieve by some
offer with a generous refund 𝑉𝑅 (𝐹), That is,
(4) 𝑉𝑅 (𝐹) ≡ sup𝜀
𝑉((1 − 𝜀, 1 − 𝜀1 − 𝛾)| 𝐹) = ∫
1
𝛾
𝑞 − 𝛾
1 − 𝛾𝑑𝐹 (𝑞) .
We derive 𝐹𝑉∗ in the following steps. We first characterize the seller’s highest profit
from a non-refundable offer for a given buyer’s signal distribution 𝐹, which we denote by
𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹). We also identify a lower bound of the seller’s profit from a generous refund when
his profit from a non-refundable offer is𝑉, which we denote by𝛷 (𝑉). Lastly, we show that
a distribution 𝐹 that minimizes max {𝛷 (𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹)) , 𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹)} is a worst distribution 𝐹𝑉∗ for
the seller, and 𝑉∗ = 𝛷 (𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹𝑉∗)).
Take an arbitrary signal distribution 𝐹. By applying an argument similar to Roesler
and Szentes (2017), we find that the profit the seller can achieve by a non-refundable offer
is
𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) ≡ inf {𝑉 ∶ 𝐹 (𝑞) ≥ 𝐺𝑉 (𝑞) for all 𝑞} ,
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where
(5) 𝐺𝑉 (𝑞) ≡
{{
{{
{
0 if 𝑞 ∈ [0, 𝑉) ,
1 − 𝑉𝑞 if 𝑞 ∈ [𝑉, 1) ,
1 if 𝑞 = 1.
To see this, notice that if the buyer’s distribution is 𝐺𝑉, then for any non-refundable offer
(𝑝, 0) , 𝑝 ≥ 𝑉, the seller’s profit is 𝑉 because the buyer’s demand is unit elastic. Therefore,
if 𝐹(𝑞) = 𝐺𝑉(𝑞) for some 𝑉 and 𝑞 ≥ 𝑉, then the seller’s profit from a non-refundable offer
is 𝑉.12
Next, take an arbitrary buyer’s distribution𝐹 such that𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) = 𝑉. We derive a lower-
bound of the seller’s profit from a generous refund, which we denote by 𝛷 (𝑉). We note
that, by (4), the seller’s profit from a generous refund is equal to the case where the buyer’s
signal distribution is 𝐹 ∈ F such that 𝐹 (𝑞) = 𝐹 (𝑞) for all 𝑞 ∈ [0, 𝛾), and 𝐹 (𝑞) = 𝐹 (𝛾) for
all 𝑞 ∈ [𝛾, 1]. Therefore, if the buyer’s signal distribution is 𝐹, then the seller’s profit from
a generous refund is 1 − ∫1𝛾
𝐹(𝑞)
1−𝛾 𝑑𝑞 = 1 − 𝐹 (𝛾).
The nature thus can lower the seller’s profit from a generous refund (while keeping
the highest profit from a non-refundable offer at 𝑉) by making the area under 𝐹 (𝑞) on
[𝛾, 1], i.e., ∫1𝛾 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞, as large as possible subject to the constraints ∫
1
0 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 = 1−𝜋 and
𝐹 (𝑞) ≥ 𝐺𝑉 (𝑞) for all 𝑞. With this observation at hand, define
𝛷 (𝑉) ≡
{
{
{
𝑉(ln 𝑉𝛾 −1)+𝜋
1−𝛾 if 𝑉 < 𝛾,
𝜋−𝛾
1−𝛾 if 𝑉 ≥ 𝛾.
so that ∫𝛾0 𝐺𝑉 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛷 (𝑉)) = 1 − 𝜋. Then, we can conclude that the seller’s
profit from a generous refund is at least 𝛷 (𝑉). Furthermore, the seller’s profit from a gen-
erous refund is 𝛷 (𝑉) if 𝐹 (𝑞) = 𝐺𝑉 (𝑞) for all 𝑞 ∈ [0, 𝛾).
Let ?̂? be 𝑉 ∈ [0, 𝛾] that minimizes max {𝑉, 𝛷 (𝑉)}. Observe that 𝛷 (𝑉) is strictly de-
creasing in 𝑉 on [0, 𝛾), and lim𝑉→𝛾𝛷 (𝑉) =
𝜋−𝛾
1−𝛾 . Therefore, either (i) 𝛷 (𝑉) > 𝑉 for all
𝑉 ∈ [0, 𝛾) (when 𝜋−𝛾1−𝛾 > 𝛾, or equivalently 𝛾 < 1 − √1 − 𝜋), or (ii) there exists unique
?̃? = 𝜋−?̃?
1−𝛾−ln ?̃?𝛾
∈ [0, 𝛾] such that 𝛷 (?̃?) = ?̃? (when 𝛾 ≥ 1 − √1 − 𝜋). Therefore,
?̂? = { 𝛾 if 𝛾 < 1 −
√1 − 𝜋,
?̃? if 𝛾 ≥ 1 − √1 − 𝜋, and 𝛷(?̂?) ≥ ?̂?.
Now, define 𝐹𝑉∗ by
(6) 𝐹𝑉∗ (𝑞) ≡
{{{
{{{
{
0 if 𝑞 ∈ [0, 𝛷 (?̂?)) ,
𝐺?̂? (𝑞) if 𝑞 ∈ [𝛷 (?̂?) , 𝛾) ,
1 − ?̂? if 𝑞 ∈ [max {𝛷 (?̂?) , 𝛾} , 1) ,
1 if 𝑞 = 1.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate 𝐹𝑉∗ when 𝛾 < 1 − √1 − 𝜋 and 𝛾 ≥ 1 − √1 − 𝜋, respectively.
12More formally, the supremum of the seller’s profit from a non-refundable offer, i.e., sup𝑝 𝑉 ((𝑝, 0) |𝐹),
is sup𝑝 𝑝 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝) + 𝛥𝐹 (𝑝)), where 𝛥𝐹 (𝑝) is the size of atom of 𝐹 at 𝑝. Furthermore, since
𝐹 (𝑞) ≥ 𝐺𝑉𝑁𝑅(𝐹) (𝑞) for all 𝑞, we have 𝑝 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝) + 𝛥𝐹 (𝑝)) ≤ 𝑝 (1 − 𝐺𝑉𝑁𝑅(𝐹) (𝑝)) for all 𝑝. Since
𝑝 (1 − 𝐺𝑉𝑁𝑅(𝐹) (𝑝)) = 𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) for all 𝑝 ∈ [𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) , 1], we have sup𝑝 𝑉 ((𝑝, 0) |𝐹) = 𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹).
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𝑞0
1
1𝛾 𝛷(?̂?) = 𝜋−𝛾1−𝛾
𝛷(?̂?)
?̂? = 𝛾
𝐹𝑉∗
𝐺?̂?
𝐺𝛷(?̂?)
(a) 𝛾 < 1 − √1 − 𝜋
𝑞0
1
1?̂? = 𝛷(?̂?) 𝛾
𝛷(?̂?) ?̂?
𝐹𝑉∗
𝐺?̂?
(b) 𝛾 ≥ 1 − √1 − 𝜋
Figure 4: Worst-case distribution 𝐹𝑉∗
Lemma2. Suppose that the buyer’s signal distribution is𝐹𝑉∗ . Then the seller’s profit and profit
from a generous refund are both 𝛷(?̂?), i.e., sup(𝑝,𝑟)𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) = 𝑉𝑅 (𝐹𝑉∗) = 𝛷 (?̂?).
Proof. In Appendix.
Furthermore, for any distribution 𝐹 ≠ 𝐹𝑉∗ , there exists a non-refundable offer or
a generous refund that brings a profit higher than 𝛷(?̂?). If 𝐹 (𝑞) < 𝐹𝑉∗ (𝑞) for some
𝑞 ∈ [0, 𝛾), then the seller’s profit from a non-refundable offer (𝑞, 0) is higher than ?̂?, i.e.,
𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) > ?̂? = 𝛷 (?̂?). Next, suppose that 𝐹 (𝑞) ≥ 𝐹𝑉∗ (𝑞) for all 𝑞 ∈ [0, 𝛾) so that
∫1𝛾 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 ≤ ∫
1
𝛾 𝐹𝑉∗ (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞. Then the seller’s profit from a generous refund 1 − ∫
1
𝛾
𝐹(𝑞)
1−𝛾 𝑑𝑞
exceeds 𝛷(?̂?) = 1 − ∫1𝛾
𝐹𝑉∗ (𝑞)
1−𝛾 𝑑𝑞. Therefore,
sup
(𝑝,𝑟)
𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) ≥ sup
(𝑝,𝑟)
𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) for all 𝐹 ∈ F.
This proves that 𝑉∗ = 𝛷 (?̂?), and13
(7) 𝑉∗ =
{
{
{
𝜋−𝛾
1−𝛾 if 𝛾 < 1 − √1 − 𝜋,
𝜋−𝑉∗
1−𝛾−ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
= −𝜋
𝑊−1(− 𝜋𝛾 𝑒𝛾−2)
if 𝛾 ≥ 1 − √1 − 𝜋.
Lemma 3. The distribution 𝐹𝑉∗ , defined by (6), is a seller’s worst distribution. If the buyer’s
signal distribution is 𝐹𝑉∗ , then the highest profit the seller can achieve is 𝑉
∗ defined by (7),
and it bounds the guaranteed-profit 𝑉∗ from above.
3.3 An Optimal Stochastic Policy
We now identify the seller’s best guaranteed-profit 𝑉∗ using the lower bound 𝑉∗ (the red
dotted line in Figure 5) and the upper bound 𝑉∗ (the blue solid line in Figure 5). For each
13The function𝑊−1(⋅) ≤ −1 denotes the lower branch of the LambertW function, i.e. function𝑊−1(𝑥) = 𝑧
is defined as the smaller of the two real solutions to the equation 𝑧𝑒𝑧 = 𝑥 for 𝑧 < 0.
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𝜀 > 0, we show that there exists a strategy 𝛥 {(𝑝, 𝑟)} such that
(1 − 𝜀) 𝑉∗ ≤ 𝔼𝛥{(𝑝,𝑟)}𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) for all 𝐹 ∈ F.
This establishes that the seller’s best guaranteed-profit is 𝑉∗, i.e., 𝑉∗ = 𝑉∗.
1
1 𝛾
Profit
0 𝛾 = 1 − √1 − 𝜋
𝜋
𝑉∗: Upper bound of BGP
𝑉∗: Lower bound of BGP
BGP without refunds
Figure 5: 𝑉∗ (Lemma 1) and 𝑉∗ (Lemma 3)
By Lemmas 1 and 3, 𝑉∗ = 𝑉∗ whenever the normalized restocking cost 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾 =
1 − √1 − 𝜋; and 𝑉∗ > 𝑉∗ if 𝛾 > 𝛾. Therefore, if 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾, then by the analysis in Section 3.1,
for any 𝜀 > 0, there exists a generous refund that achieves (1 − 𝜀) 𝑉∗. If 𝛾 ≥ 𝛾, however,
then for any deterministic pricing policy (𝑝, 𝑟), there exists a signal distribution 𝐹 such
that 𝑉∗ > 𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹). This implies that the seller cannot guarantee profits close to 𝑉∗
by a deterministic policy. Nevertheless, for any 𝜀 > 0, there exists a pricing policy that
guarantees (1 − 𝜀) 𝑉∗.
To see this, we say a strategy is amixture of log-uniform discounts and a generous refund
if, for some 𝜀 > 0, the seller makes:14
1. non-refundable discounted offers (𝑝, 0), 𝑝 ∈ [𝑉∗, 𝛾) , with density
𝑠𝜀0 (𝑝) =
{
{
{
0 if 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾,
1
𝑝(1−𝛾−ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾 )
if 𝛾 > 𝛾,
2. a generous refund (𝑝, 𝑟) = (1 − 𝜀, 1 − 𝜀1−𝛾) with probability
𝑠𝜀𝑟 =
{
{
{
1 if 𝛾 ≤ 𝛾
1 − ∫𝛾𝑉∗ 𝑠
𝜀
0 (𝑝) 𝑑𝑝 =
1−𝛾
1−𝛾−ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
if 𝛾 > 𝛾 .
Below we show that the seller can guarantee himself the upper bound 𝑉∗ identified in
Section 3.2 by a mixture of log-uniform discounts and a generous refund. More specifi-
cally, the supremum of the guaranteed profit from all mixtures of log-uniform discounts
14This is a variant of the exponential price auction found in Du (2018).
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and a generous refund is𝑉∗. Loosely speaking, any pricing policy that brings a large profit
when the buyer is relatively well-informed tends to perform poorly when the buyer is rel-
atively uninformed, and vice versa. Therefore, to increase his guaranteed profit, the seller
needs to hedge simultaneously against the buyer’s signal distributions that are relatively
informative and relatively uninformative. A mixture of log-uniform discounts and a gen-
erous refund achieves this goal: the randomization over non-refundable offers works as a
hedge against the distributions that are not informative while the refundable offer works
as a hedge against the distributions that are informative.
As we formally show in the proof ofTheorem 1, when he uses amixture of log-uniform
discounts and a generous refund and the buyer’s signal distribution turns out to be 𝐹, the
seller’s (expected) profit from some non-refundable offer ?̃?𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) and from the generous
refund ?̃?𝑅 (𝐹) are, respectively,
?̃?𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) =
𝛾 − 𝑉∗ − ∫𝛾𝑉∗ 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
and ?̃?𝑅 (𝐹) =
𝜋 − 𝛾 + ∫𝛾0 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
+ 𝑜𝜀,
The seller’s profit from non-refundable offers, ?̃?𝑁𝑅 (𝐹), is decreasing in ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗ 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞. Since
∫10 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 = 1 − 𝜋 and 𝐹 is increasing, if ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗ 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 is small, then ∫
1
𝛾 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 is large.
Loosely speaking, this occurs when 𝐹 (𝑞) is relatively large and flat on [𝛾, 1], i.e., 𝐹 is rela-
tively uninformative. In contrast, ∫𝛾𝑉∗ 𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 is large, i.e., ?̃?𝑁𝑅 (𝐹) is small, when 𝐹 (𝑞) is
relatively small and flat on [𝛾, 1], i.e., 𝐹 is relatively informative. In this sense, the random-
ization over non-refundable offers (in themixture of log-uniformdiscounts and a generous
refund) brings a large profit when the buyer’s signal distribution is uninformative, and a
small profit when the buyer’s signal distribution is informative. A similar argument show
that in clear contrast to ?̃?𝑁𝑅 (𝐹), the seller’s profit from the generous refund, ?̃?𝑅 (𝐹), brings
a large profit when the buyer’s signal distribution is informative, and a small profit when
the buyer’s signal distribution is uninformative.
Theorem 1. For any 𝜀, there exists a mixture of log-uniform discounts and a generous refund
that guarantees profit of (1 − 𝜀) 𝑉∗. That is, the seller’s best guaranteed-profit 𝑉∗ is 𝑉∗.
Proof. In Appendix.
Observe that the seller’s best guaranteed-profit𝑉∗ is strictly higher than the best profit
the seller can guarantee without refunds sup𝑝min𝐹∈F 𝑉 ((𝑝, 0) |𝐹) (i.e., the brown dotted-
line in Figure 5). The reason is that without the opportunity of making refundable offers,
which work as a hedge against informative signal distributions, the seller is forced to use
a pricing policy that induces lower prices more frequently. Then, however, the resulting
profit would be lower when the buyer’s signal distribution turned out to be not so infor-
mative.15
15The result reported here is closely related to the finding in Du (2018) that analyzes the environment
where the seller cannot make refundable offers (or equivalently the restocking cost is infinitely large). Du
(2018) shows that the distribution 𝐹𝑉∗𝑁𝑅 , where 𝑉
∗
𝑁𝑅 ∈ (0, 𝑉
∗) that uniquely solves 𝑉∗𝑁𝑅(1 − ln𝑉
∗
𝑁𝑅) = 𝜋, is
the worst possible buyer’s information structure for the seller; and that the log-uniformly randomized prices
over [𝑉∗𝑁𝑅, 1] achieves the seller’s best guaranteed-profit regardless of the buyer’s signal distribution. We also
note that Roesler and Szentes (2017) show that this distribution 𝐹𝑉∗𝑁𝑅 maximizes the buyer’s welfare when
the seller best responds to this information structure via uniform pricing.
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3.4 Best Guaranteed-Profit with General Mechanisms
We have identified the best guaranteed-profit 𝑉∗ that the seller can achieve using a simple
randomized pricing and refund policy. One may wonder if the seller can improve his best
guaranteed-profit by using a more intricate mechanism that screens the buyer based on
her signal distribution 𝐹 and her realized signal 𝑞. Below we show that there exists no such
mechanism. More specifically, for any (indirect or direct) mechanism, the seller’s profit is
bounded from above by 𝑉∗ for some buyer’s signal distribution.
To show this, we analyze an auxiliary game in which the nature chooses the buyer’s
signal distribution 𝐹, and then the seller chooses a mechanism after observing the na-
ture’s choice. We show that if the buyer’s signal distribution is 𝐹𝑉∗ , then the seller’s profit
is bounded from above by 𝑉∗. Since the seller’s best guaranteed-profit is bounded from
below by 𝑉∗, the seller’s equilibrium profit of this auxiliary game is 𝑉∗. Furthermore, the
seller’s equilibrium profit of this auxiliary game defines an upper bound of the seller’s best
guaranteed-profit.
We first note that, for anymechanism that the seller chooses after observing the nature’s
choice, there exists an outcome-equivalent simple static direct mechanism with refunds.
Definition 1. We say amechanism𝑀 ≡ {𝑝 (𝑞) , {𝛼0 (𝑞) , 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞)}}𝑞∈[0,1] is a directmechanism
with refunds if, for each buyer’s report 𝑞 ∈ [0, 1], themechanism specifies (i)𝑝(𝑞): the transfer
from the buyer to the seller; (ii) 𝛼0 (𝑞) ∈ [0, 1]: the probability that the buyer receives the
product without an option to return; and (iii) 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞) ∈ [0, 1 − 𝛼0 (𝑞)]: the probability that
the buyer receives the product with an option to return with refund 𝑟 = 1.
Lemma4. Take an arbitrary subgame following the nature’s move. For any outcome the seller
can induce by an indirect mechanism, there exists an outcome-equivalent direct mechanism
with refunds that is individually rational and incentive compatible.
Proof. In the appendix.
Let 𝐹 be the nature’s choice. Under a given direct mechanism with refunds 𝑀 =
{𝑝 (𝑞) , {𝛼0 (𝑞) , 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞)}}𝑞∈[0,1], if the buyer with signal 𝑞 reports 𝑞
′, then her payoff is
𝑈(𝑞′; 𝑞|𝑀) ≡ (𝛼0 (𝑞′) + 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞′)) 𝑞 + 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞′) (1 − 𝑞) − 𝑝 (𝑞′)
= 𝑞𝛼0 (𝑞′) − (𝑝 (𝑞′) − 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞′)) .
The seller’s profit is 𝔼𝐹 [𝑣 (𝑞|𝑀)], where 𝑣 (𝑞|𝑀) is his profit from the buyer with signal 𝑞,
i.e.,
𝑣 (𝑞|𝑀) ≡ 𝑝 (𝑞) − 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞) (1 − 𝑞) (𝑐 + 1) = 𝑝 (𝑞) − 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞)
1 − 𝑞
1 − 𝛾.
LetM be the set of all direct mechanisms with refunds 𝑀 that satisfy the following two
conditions:
𝑈(𝑞; 𝑞|𝑀) ≥ 𝑈(𝑞′; 𝑞|𝑀) for all 𝑞′ and 𝑞,(IC)
𝑈(𝑞; 𝑞|𝑀) ≥ 0 for all 𝑞.(IR)
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By adopting the standard argument, we can simplify the seller’s problem to the one in
which he chooses an increasing function 𝛼0 (⋅) (instead of 𝑀, which is a triplet of func-
tions, that satisfies IC and IR). More formally, the incentive compatibility condition (IC)
is equivalent to
𝛼0 (𝑞) is increasing in 𝑞 and 𝑈(𝑞; 𝑞|𝑀) = ∫
𝑞
0
𝛼0 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞.
Therefore, if 𝑀∗ = {𝑝∗ (𝑞) , {𝛼∗0 (𝑞) , 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞)}}𝑞∈[0,1] is the seller’s best-response to the na-
ture’s choice 𝐹, then we can represent 𝑣 (𝑞|𝑀∗), i.e., the seller’s profit from buyer with
signal 𝑞, independent of 𝑝∗ (𝑞) and 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞).
Lemma 5. Suppose that 𝑀∗ = {𝑝∗ (𝑞) , {𝛼∗0 (𝑞) , 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞)}}𝑞∈[0,1] is a seller’s best-response to
the nature’s choice 𝐹, then
𝛼∗0 (𝑞) is increasing, 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞) = {
0 if 𝑞 < 𝛾,
1 − 𝛼∗0 (𝑞) if 𝑞 ≥ 𝛾,
and, 𝑣 (𝑞|𝑀∗) = 𝑣 (𝑞|𝛼∗0 ), where
(8) 𝑣 (𝑞|𝛼∗0 ) ≡ {
𝑞𝛼∗0 (𝑞) − ∫
𝑞
0 𝛼
∗
0 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 if 𝑞 < 𝛾,
𝑞𝛼∗0 (𝑞) +
𝑞−𝛾
1−𝛾 (1 − 𝛼
∗
0 (𝑞)) − ∫
𝑞
0 𝛼
∗
0 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 if 𝑞 ≥ 𝛾.
Proof. In Appendix.
In the subgame where the nature has chosen 𝐹𝑉∗ , the seller’s payoff is 𝑉
∗.
Lemma 6. Suppose that 𝑀∗ = {𝑝∗ (𝑞) , {𝛼∗0 (𝑞) , 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞)}}𝑞∈[0,1] is a seller’s best-response to
the nature’s choice 𝐹𝑉∗ . Then 𝔼𝐹𝑉∗ [𝑣 (𝑞|𝑀
∗)] = 𝔼𝐹𝑉∗ [𝑣 (𝑞|𝛼
∗
0 )] = 𝑉∗.
Proof. In the appendix.
Therefore, the seller’s equilibrium profit in this auxiliary game is 𝑉∗. Furthermore,
the seller’s equilibrium profit defines an upper bound of the seller’s best-guaranteed profit,
which is bounded from below by 𝑉∗. We thus have the required result.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the seller can guarantee himself 𝑉 using some mechanism. Then,
for any 𝜀 > 0, there exists a mixture of log-uniform discounts and a generous refund that
guarantees (1 − 𝜀) 𝑉.
4 Buyer-Optimal Outcomes
In this section, we identify the buyer-optimal information structure and the outcomes that
can be supported by some information structure. We analyze the following game:
1. The buyer chooses a signal distribution 𝐹 ∈ F.
2. The seller observes the signal structure and chooses amechanism. By the arguments
above, we can without loss in generality focus on (deterministic) policies (𝑝, 𝑟).
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3. The buyer observes a signal generated by 𝐹, and then decides whether to purchase
or not.
The key assumption we impose is that the buyer commits to a signal distribution at the
beginning of the game. In other words, the buyer commits not to learn any information
that is not contained in the signal generated using distribution 𝐹.16 Note that if the buyer
lacks such a commitment power, then she would choose to acquire a fully informative
signal. Knowing this, the seller would always set the price to 1 and can capture the full
surplus.
Given our focus on the buyer-optimal outcome, we assume that the seller makes an
offer that induces a higher buyer’s payoff in case he is indifferent between two or more
offers. Therefore, the assumption that the seller only uses a deterministic policy is without
loss. More formally, let 𝑈((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) be the buyer’s payoff when her signal distribution
𝐹 ∈ F, and the offer is (𝑝, 𝑟). Also, let𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) be the corresponding seller’s profit. Let
(𝑝∗, 𝑟∗)𝐹 be an element in 𝑆
∗ (𝐹) ≡ argmax(𝑝,𝑟)𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) such that
𝑈((𝑝∗, 𝑟∗)𝐹 |𝐹) = max(𝑝∗,𝑟∗)∈𝑆∗(𝐹)
𝑈((𝑝∗, 𝑟∗) |𝐹) .
Our goal is to characterize
𝐹∗ ∈ argmax
𝐹∈F
𝑈((𝑝∗, 𝑟∗)𝐹 |𝐹) , and 𝑈
∗ ≡ 𝑈 ((𝑝∗, 𝑟∗)𝐹∗ |𝐹
∗) .
Note that the seller’s attempt to maximize his profit can cause inefficiency through two
channels. First, the seller may make an offer that results in no sales even if the buyer’s
expected value is strictly positive. Second, even when the buyer accepts the seller’s offer,
the product may be returned. Nevertheless, there exists a buyer-optimal outcome that is
efficient.
The total surplus from trade is bounded from above by 𝜋. Furthermore, the seller can
guarantee a profit of 𝑉∗ irrespective of the choice the buyer makes (Theorem 1). There-
fore, the buyer’s payoff under the buyer-optimal information structure 𝑈∗ is bounded
from above 𝜋 − 𝑉∗. However, the preceding analysis implies that this bound is sharp,
i.e., 𝑈∗ = 𝜋 − 𝑉∗, and the worst distribution 𝐹𝑉∗ for the seller identified in Section 3.2 is
the buyer-optimal signal distribution. This is because when the buyer’s signal distribution
is 𝐹𝑉∗ the seller’s profit is maximized by offering (𝑝, 𝑟) = (𝑉∗, 0). More precisely,
sup
(𝑝,𝑟)
𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) = 𝑉
∗ = 𝑉 ((𝑉∗, 0) |𝐹𝑉∗) .
Furthermore, when the seller offers (𝑉∗, 0), the trade occurs with probability one and there
are no returns. Consequently, 𝑈((𝑉∗, 0) |𝐹) = 𝜋 − 𝑉∗.
Theorem 3. The seller’s worst signal distribution 𝐹𝑉∗ is a buyer-optimal signal distribution.
Under the corresponding buyer-optimal outcome, the seller’s profit and the buyer’s payoff are
𝑉∗ and 𝜋 − 𝑉∗, respectively.
16An interpretation of our buyer-optimality result is as follows: the buyer ex-ante delegates the information
gathering to a third-party, such as an agent or an algorithm, knowing that the seller best responds to the signal
structure by choosing a pricing policy.
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As an immediate corollary, we can characterize pairs of buyer’s payoff and seller’s profit
that can be supported by some signal structure. More precisely, we say (?̂?, ?̂?) is a feasi-
ble outcome supported by a 𝐹 if ( ̂𝑝, ̂𝑟) maximizes 𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹) with respect to (𝑝, 𝑟); ?̂? =
𝑉 (( ̂𝑝, ̂𝑟) |𝐹); and ?̂? = 𝑈 (( ̂𝑝, ̂𝑟) |𝐹). We denote the set of all feasible outcomes byO. It fol-
lows from the previous discussion that O = {(𝑈,𝑉) ∶ 𝑉 ∈ [𝑉∗, 𝜋 − 𝑈] , 𝑈 ∈ [0, 𝜋 − 𝑉∗]}.
5 Discussion
We analyzed the seller’s robust pricing problem with uncertainty about the buyer’s infor-
mation and learning, and showed that a simple mechanism that utilizes a generous refund
achieves the best guaranteed-profit.
Our model hinges on the key, but restrictive, assumption of a binary buyer valuation,
which significantly simplifies the analysis. This assumption is reasonable if buyers’ primary
concerns are of the exact product match: e.g., shoes and clothes either do or don’t fit, a
gadget is either compatible with the buyer’s use or not, and a business traveler either needs
to be in a particular location on a specific date or not. We note that the implication of
this assumption is twofold. First, there exists a one-to-one mapping between signals and
expected willingness to pays for the product (in the absence of a refund policy). Second, a
buyer’s return decision is independent of the amount of refund.
Those two properties fail to hold ifmore than two levels of product fit are present. Thus,
the assumption of binary buyer valuation, whilst restrictive, is important for the tractability
of the model. More precisely, in the absence of a refund policy, the buyer buys only if her
signal 𝑞, i.e., a posterior over possible levels of product fit 𝑣, satisfies𝔼𝑞 [𝑣] ≥ 𝑝. That is, the
seller’s profit depends on the buyer’s signal 𝑞 only through the value of expectedwillingness
to pay it induces, i.e., 𝔼𝑞 [𝑣]. In this sense, if the seller cannot utilize a refund policy, then
we still can represent the seller’s uncertainty as the uncertainty over distributions over ex-
pected willingness to pays, which is a one-dimensional random variable.17 In the presence
of a refund policy (𝑝, 𝑟), however, the buyer with signal 𝑞 buys only if the right-tail of 𝑞
is sufficiently fat, i.e., Pr (𝑣 > 𝑟|𝑞) 𝔼𝑞 [𝑣|𝑣 > 𝑟] + Pr (𝑣 ≤ 𝑟|𝑞) 𝑟 ≥ 𝑝. Therefore, two signals
with an identical willingness to pay can result in different outcomes for the seller. Conse-
quently, we are no longer able to capture the seller’s uncertainty in terms of the uncertainty
over distributions on expected willingness to pays, rendering the generalization into this
direction not straightforward.
Having said that, we conjecture that the relaxation of the binary buyer valuation as-
sumption yields qualitatively similar results: for any given restocking cost, there exists a
generous refund policy (or a randomization over refund policies) that guarantees the seller
a non-negative ex-post (expected) profit; and hence the seller can strictly improve his profit
against the worst signal distribution by utilizing such a refund policy.
Another aspect that we did not address is the seller’s learning of demand through pric-
ing. Our insight that a well-designed refund policy limits the significance of buyer learning
on the seller’s profit should apply even in a dynamic environment. However, in a dynamic
environment, carefully designed dynamic pricing and resulting buyer’s purchasing and re-
17More precisely, the distributions (over signals) thatminimize the seller’s profit from a deterministic non-
refundable offer; and the seller’s worst distribution over signals when the seller cannot utilize a refund policy
can both be characterized in terms of distributions over expected willingness to pays.
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turn decisions can also be used to learn about what/how buyers learn about the product
fit, and hence to improve future pricing decisions. Investigating how the seller’s learning
motive would shape the intertemporal pricing with refunds would be an interesting venue
for future research.
Another possible venue is the application to platform designs. A platform, such as
eBay or Airbnb, could choose information that is revealed to the buyer. The seller chooses
a pricing and return policy, and the buyer makes a purchasing and return decision. In
the absence of competition among platforms, it is natural to expect that one of the Pareto-
optimal outcomes identified in the previous section would arise. Analyzing how competi-
tion affects the welfare and equilibrium information structure is an interesting question.
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A Proofs for Section 3 (Best Guaranteed-Profit)
Proof of Lemma 2: First, suppose that 𝛾 < 1−√1 − 𝜋. Then𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹𝑉∗) = 𝛷 (?̂?). Consider
a refundable offer (𝑝, 𝑟). If 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) > 𝛷 (?̂?), then
𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) = 𝛾𝑝 ≤ 𝛾 <
𝜋 − 𝛾
1 − 𝛾 = 𝛷 (?̂?) .
If 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) ≤ 𝛷 (?̂?), then
𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) = 𝑝 − (1 − 𝜋)(𝑟 + 𝑐)
= 𝑝 − (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛷 (?̂?))(
𝑝 − 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟)
1 − 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟)
+ 𝛾1 − 𝛾) (increasing in 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) , 𝑝)
≤ 1 − (1 − 𝛾) (1 − 𝛷 (?̂?))(
1 − 𝛷 (?̂?)
1 − 𝛷 (?̂?)
+ 𝛾1 − 𝛾) = 𝛷 (?̂?) .
Next, suppose that 𝛾 ≥ 1 − √1 − 𝜋. Then 𝑉𝑁𝑅 (𝐹𝑉∗) = ?̂? = 𝛷 (?̂?). Consider a
refundable offer (𝑝, 𝑟). If 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) > 𝛾, then 𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) ≤ ?̂? = 𝛷 (?̂?). If 𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) ≤ 𝛾,
then 𝑉((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹𝑉∗) < 𝛷 (?̂?) because the seller’s profit from the buyer with signal 𝑞 ∈
[𝑞 (𝑝, 𝑟) , 𝛾] is negative.
Proof of Theorem 1: We limit our attention to the case where 𝛾 > 𝛾. Fix arbitrary signal
structure 𝐹. The seller’s payoff of using policy with 𝜀 is
𝔼 [𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹)] = ?̃?𝑁𝑅(𝐹)⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
profit from discounts
+ ?̃?𝜀𝑅(𝐹)⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
profit from a generous refund
,
where
?̃?𝑁𝑅(𝐹) ≡ ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗
𝑝 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝)) 𝑠𝜀0 (𝑝) 𝑑𝑝,
?̃?𝜀𝑅(𝐹) ≡ 𝑠𝜀𝑟 ∫
1
𝛾
((1 − 𝜀) − (1 − 𝑞) ((1 − 𝜀1 − 𝛾) + 𝑐))𝑑𝐹 (𝑞) .
Observe that
?̃?𝑁𝑅(𝐹) = ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗
𝑝 (1 − 𝐹 (𝑝)) 𝑠𝜀0 (𝑝) 𝑑𝑝 =
1
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
∫
𝛾
𝑉∗
(1 − 𝐹 (𝑝)) 𝑑𝑝
=
𝛾 − 𝑉∗ − ∫𝛾𝑉∗ 𝐹 (𝑝) 𝑑𝑝
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
≥
𝛾 − 𝑉∗ − ∫𝛾0 𝐹 (𝑝) 𝑑𝑝
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
,
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and
?̃?𝜀𝑅(𝐹) = 𝑠𝜀𝑟 ∫
1
𝛾
(1 − 𝜀 − (1 − 𝑞) (1 − 𝜀1 − 𝛾 +
𝛾
1 − 𝛾))𝑑𝐹 (𝑞)
= 1 − 𝛾
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
(1 − (1 + 𝑐) ∫
1
𝛾
𝐹 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 − 𝜀∫
1
𝛾
(1 + 1 − 𝑞1 − 𝛾)𝑑𝐹 (𝑞))
=
𝜋 − 𝛾 + ∫𝛾0 𝐹 (𝑝) 𝑑𝑝
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
− 𝜀 (1 − 𝛾)
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
∫
1
𝛾
(1 + 1 − 𝑞1 − 𝛾)𝑑𝐹 (𝑞) .
Recall that 𝜋−𝑉
∗
1−𝛾−ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
= 𝑉∗ by (7). We thus have
𝔼 [𝑉 ((𝑝, 𝑟) |𝐹)] = ?̃?𝑁𝑅(𝐹) + ?̃?𝜀𝑅(𝐹)
≥ 𝜋 − 𝑉
∗
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
− 𝜀 (1 − 𝛾)
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
∫
1
𝛾
(1 + 1 − 𝑞1 − 𝛾)𝑑𝐹 (𝑞)
= 𝑉∗ − 𝜀 (1 − 𝛾)
1 − 𝛾 − ln 𝑉
∗
𝛾
∫
1
𝛾
(1 + 1 − 𝑞1 − 𝛾)𝑑𝐹 (𝑞) .
Proof of Lemma 4: Any outcome the seller can induce by an indirect mechanism can
be induced by an individually-rational and incentive-compatible direct mechanism 𝛹 =
{𝛼𝑞, 𝑝𝑞, {(𝜅0𝑞, 𝜏0𝑞) , (𝜅1𝑞, 𝜏1𝑞)}} that specifies, for each 𝑞 ∈ [0, 1], (i) 𝛼𝑞: the probability that
the buyer receives the product; (ii) 𝑝𝑞: the transfer from the buyer to the seller; and (iii)
{𝜅𝑣𝑞, 𝜏𝑣𝑞}𝑣∈{0,1}: the direct mechanism that specifies, for each buyer’s reported realized valu-
ation 𝑣 ∈ {0, 1}, (a) 𝜅𝑣𝑞: the probability the buyer keeps the product; and (b) 𝜏𝑣𝑞 : the transfer
from the seller to the buyer with the following properties: (IR) 𝜅1𝑞 + 𝜏1𝑞 ≥ 1 and 𝜅0𝑞 + 𝜏0𝑞 ≥ 0
and (IC) 𝜅1𝑞 + 𝜏1𝑞 ≥ 𝜅0𝑞 + 𝜏0𝑞 and 𝜏0𝑞 ≥ 𝜏1𝑞 . Notice that for any stochastic direct mechanisms
(over {𝛼𝑞, 𝑝𝑞, {(𝜅0𝑞, 𝜏0𝑞) , (𝜅1𝑞, 𝜏1𝑞)}}), there exists an outcome-equivalent deterministic di-
rect mechanism. So without loss, we limit our attention to deterministic mechanisms.
Under this direct mechanism𝛹 = {𝛼𝑞, 𝑝𝑞, {(𝜅0𝑞, 𝜏0𝑞) , (𝜅1𝑞, 𝜏1𝑞)}}, the payoff of the buyer
with signal 𝑞 and the seller’s profit from her are, respectively,
𝑢 (𝛹) ≡ 𝛼𝑞 (𝑞 (𝜅1𝑞 + 𝜏1𝑞) + (1 − 𝑞) 𝜏0𝑞) − 𝑝𝑞,
𝑣 (𝑞|𝛹) ≡ 𝑝𝑞 − 𝛼𝑞 [𝑞 ((1 − 𝜅1𝑞) 𝑐 + 𝜏1𝑞) − (1 − 𝑞) ((1 − 𝜅0𝑞) 𝑐 + 𝜏0𝑞)] .
Notice that without loss, we can assume that 𝜅1𝑞 = 1, 𝜏1𝑞 = 0, 𝜏0𝑞 = 1. To see this, consider
?̃? ≡ {𝛼𝑞, 𝑝𝑞, {(?̃?0𝑞, 𝜏0𝑞) , (?̃?1𝑞, 𝜏1𝑞)}} such that (?̃?1𝑞, 𝜏1𝑞) ≠ (1, 0); and𝛹 ≡ {𝛼𝑞, 𝑝𝑞, {(𝜅0𝑞, 𝜏0𝑞) , (𝜅1𝑞, 𝜏1𝑞)}}
such that (i) (𝜅1𝑞, 𝜏1𝑞) = (1, 0); (ii) (𝜅0𝑞, 𝜏0𝑞) = (?̃?0𝑞, 1); (iii) 𝑝𝑞 = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝛼𝑞𝑞 (?̃?1𝑞 + 𝜏1𝑞 − 1) +
𝛼𝑞 (1 − 𝑞) (𝜏0𝑞 − 1). Then,
𝑢 (?̃?) = 𝛼𝑞 (𝑞 (?̃?1𝑞 + 𝜏1𝑞) + (1 − 𝑞) 𝜏0𝑞) − 𝑝𝑞
= 𝛼𝑞 (𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞)) − 𝑝𝑞 = 𝑢 (𝛹)
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and
𝑣 (𝑞|?̃?) = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝛼𝑞 [𝑞 ((1 − ?̃?1𝑞) 𝑐 + 𝜏1𝑞) − (1 − 𝑞) ((1 − ?̃?0𝑞) 𝑐 + 𝜏0𝑞)]
= 𝑝𝑞 − 𝛼𝑞 [𝑞 ((1 − ?̃?1𝑞) (𝑐 + 1)) + (1 − 𝑞) ((1 − ?̃?0𝑞) 𝑐 + 1)]
≤ 𝑝𝑞 − 𝛼𝑞 (1 − 𝑞) ((1 − ?̃?0𝑞) 𝑐 + 1) = 𝑣 (𝑞|𝛹) .
If we denote 𝛼0 (𝑞) = 𝛼𝑞 (1 − 𝑞) ?̃?0𝑞, and 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞) = 𝛼𝑞 (𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞) (1 − ?̃?0𝑞)) so that 𝛼0 (𝑞) +
𝛼𝑟 (𝑞) = 𝛼𝑞, then we have the required result.
Proof of Lemma 5: Since 𝑈(𝑞; 𝑞|𝑀) = ∫𝑞0 𝛼0 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞,
𝑣 (𝑞|𝑀) = 𝑝 (𝑞) − 𝑎𝑟 (𝑞)
1 − 𝑞
1 − 𝛾 = 𝑞𝛼0 (𝑞) + 𝛼𝑟 (𝑞) − ∫
𝑞
0
𝛼0 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞 − 𝑎𝑟 (𝑞)
1 − 𝑞
1 − 𝛾
= 𝑞𝛼0 (𝑞) +
𝑞 − 𝛾
1 − 𝛾𝛼𝑟 (𝑞) − ∫
𝑞
0
𝛼0 (𝑞) 𝑑𝑞.
Observe that 𝑣 (0|𝑀) ≤ 0. Therefore, if𝑀∗ is a solution and 𝑞 = 0, then the seller chooses
𝛼∗0 (𝑞) = 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞) = 0. Next, if 𝑞 ∈ (0, 𝛾), then since
𝑞−𝛾
1−𝛾 < 0, 𝛼
∗
𝑟 (𝑞) = 0. If 𝑞 = 𝛾, 𝑣 (𝛾|𝑀∗)
does not depend on 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞). Therefore, 𝛼∗𝑟 (𝑞) = 1 − 𝛼∗0 (𝑞). Similarly, if 𝑞 ∈ (𝛾, 1], then
since 𝑞−𝛾1−𝛾 > 0, 𝛼
∗
𝑟 (𝑞) = 1 − 𝛼∗0 (𝑞).
Proof of Lemma 6: If 𝛾 < 1 − √1 − 𝜋, then the support of 𝐹𝑉∗ is {𝑉
∗, 1}. Thus, by (8),
we can conclude that 𝛼∗0 (𝑞) = 0 on[0, 𝑉
∗), and 𝛼∗0 (𝑞) = 𝛼∗0 (𝑉
∗) on (𝑉∗, 1). Since, 𝐹𝑉∗
induces 𝑉∗ and 1 with probability 1 − 𝛾 and 𝛾, respectively, the seller’s profit from using
𝑀∗ is
𝔼𝐹𝑉∗ [𝑣 (𝑞|𝛼
∗
0 )] = (1 − 𝛾) [𝑉
∗𝛼∗0 (𝑉
∗) + 𝑉
∗ − 𝛾
1 − 𝛾 (1 − 𝛼
∗
0 (𝑉
∗))]
⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
=𝑣(𝑉∗|𝛼∗0 )
+ 𝛾 [1 − 𝛼∗0 (𝑉
∗) (1 − 𝑉∗)]⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
=𝑣(1|𝛼∗0 )
= 𝑉∗.
If 𝛾 ≥ 1−√1 − 𝜋, then the support of 𝐹𝑉∗ is [𝑉
∗, 𝛾] ∪ {1}. Therefore, 𝛼∗0 (𝑞) = 0 on [0, 𝑉
∗),
and 𝛼∗0 (𝑞) = 𝛼∗0 (𝛾) on (𝛾, 1). Furthermore, 𝐹𝑉∗ has density
𝑉∗
𝑞2 over the interval [𝑉
∗, 𝛾),
and two mass points, 𝛾 (with probability 𝑉
∗
𝛾 − 𝑉
∗) and 1 (with probability 𝑉∗). Thus, the
seller’s profit from using𝑀∗ is
𝔼𝐹𝑉∗ [𝑣 (𝑞|𝛼
∗
0 )] = ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗
[𝑞𝛼∗0 (𝑞) − ∫
𝑞
𝑉∗
𝛼∗0 ( ̃𝑞)𝑑 ̃𝑞]⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
=𝑣(𝑞|𝛼∗0 ),𝑞∈[0,𝛾)
𝑉∗
𝑞2 𝑑𝑞 + (
𝑉∗
𝛾 − 𝑉
∗) [𝛾𝛼∗0 (𝛾) − ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗
𝛼∗0 (𝑞)𝑑𝑞]⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
=𝑣(𝛾|𝛼∗0 )
+ 𝑉∗ [1 − ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗
𝛼∗0 ( ̃𝑞)𝑑 ̃𝑞 − 𝛼∗0 (𝛾)(1 − 𝛾)]⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟ ⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟⏟
=𝑣(1|𝛼∗0 )
.
Since ∫𝛾𝑉∗ (𝑞𝛼
∗
0 (𝑞) − ∫
𝑞
𝑉∗ 𝛼
∗
0 ( ̃𝑞)𝑑 ̃𝑞) 𝑉
∗
𝑞2 𝑑𝑞 =
𝑉∗
𝛾 ∫
𝛾
𝑉∗ 𝛼
∗
0 (𝑞)𝑑𝑞, we have 𝔼𝐹𝑉∗ [𝑣 (𝑞|𝛼
∗
0 )] = 𝑉
∗.
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